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Is there a need for a Marshall plan in the Egyptian economy?  
An investigation of the fiscal stimulus package 
Osama El-Baz 
 
Abstract 
It has been three years since the outbreak of the January 25threvolution, the Egyptian economy 
has been suffering lower economic growth rates that reached 2.4 percent in 2012/2013, low 
investment rate triggered by the lack of security and political instability, which reached 13.3% in 
2012/13, High unemployment rate among university graduates recorded 30.1 percent by the end 
of March 2013, and high poverty headcount ratio, which reached 25.2% in 2010/11. Egypt 
received economic aids of about US$ 12 billion from Arab Gulf States after June 2013.  In order 
to stimulate the economy, the Egyptian government announced the first stimulus package 
program, of about LE 29.738 billion. I Used VAR models to estimate the elasticity of economic 
growth to public investment and four main public investment categories, both livelihood and 
industrial investments are expected to boost economic growth.  The impact “short-run” 
multiplier is expected to be 0.625, the peak multiplier is expected to equal 1.68, and the 
cumulative “long-run” multiplier is expected to equal 1.58.  Concerning the contribution of the 
fiscal stimulus program to economic growth, it is expected to boost real short-run economic 
growth rate by 0.61 percent, and it is expected to boost real long-run economic growth rate by 
0.45 percent. If the second stimulus package is to be implemented, the   short-run economic 
growth rate will be expected to reach 3.62 percent, also the long-run economic growth rate is 
expected to record 3.3 percent. 
 
1. Introduction: 
In the Economic literature, there has been a long debate on the role of the government in the 
economy. On one hand, the “minimal statism” concept  proposed by the classical economists 
means that the government should minimize its role in economic activity and to be responsible 
for the  protection of individuals from aggression, theft, breach of contract, and fraud via 
governmental institutions such as the military, police, and courts. On the other hand, Keynes 
argued the state guardian concept and Say’s law, thought that the fiscal policy can play an 
important role in stabilizing the economy through the multiplier effect. Empirical experience 
showed that the minimal role for the government is no longer appropriate, but recent 
developments in the global economy magnified the necessity of an active government, which can 
intervene with certain policy instruments to correct market failures, without disturbing the 
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market forces. The government can intervene in the economy to lessen the negative impacts of a 
recession and stimulate the economy using expansionary fiscal policies, which are called “Fiscal 
Stimulus Packages”, which were applied by several developed and developing countries in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis, by injecting finance for developmental projects such as 
infrastructure, transportation and public services. 
Empirical studies tried to tests the Keynesian notion that government expenditures can have a 
multiplier larger than 1 on aggregate income,  Wang and Wen (2013) tried to estimate the size of 
the multiplier in china, they concluded that the size government expenditure multiplier is 
significantly larger than between 2,7 and 5,6 at the national level and between 2,8 and 6,5 at 
regional level, which is larger than those found in the United States or other developed countries. 
The large size of the multiplier effect in China may justified by the 4 trillion RMB stimulus 
package implemented in 2008 and 2009, which was effective in preventing economic slowdown. 
The large multiplier effect may have negative and detrimental effects on the economy; 
government expenditure may be a major aggravating source of inflation and business cycles 
when consumption is highly sensitive to a positive shock in government expenditure than output 
“GDP”, as empirical studies found for China and Algeria ( Wang and Wen, 2013), (Chibi 
et.al,2010).  
The global financial crisis of 2008/09 and national governments’ endeavors to stimulate the 
economy in several countries through the implementation of fiscal stimulus packages has revived 
the interest in analyzing the potential impact of these packages at a macroeconomic level, using 
the multiplier concept trying to identify the potential effectiveness of the fiscal policy (Bruckner 
and Tuladhar. 2010). The American Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act (ARRA) in the spring of 2009, the largest fiscal stimulus package in U.S. history, of $825 
billion , was approved (Leduc and Wilson, 2012). 
It has been more than three years since the outbreak of the January 25th revolution, which was 
mainly fueled by economic and social needs of the Egyptian citizens; as the Egyptian economy 
was suffering macroeconomic imbalances which were vividly reflects in macroeconomic 
indicators such as budget deficit, inflation rate, exchange rate, balance of payments deficit, high 
unemployment rate; which in turn affected the well-being of the Egyptians. No effective 
economic policies were actually set in place to improve the economic and social conditions in 
Egypt, to be felt by lower and middle classes.  However, after the new government was formed 
in July 2013, realizing the implications of the deteriorating economic situation and the need for 
measures that can restore confidence in the Egyptian economy and stimulate economic activity, 
with some policies to ease the burden on the poor; the government announced about the first 
fiscal stimulus plan which became effective after  the presidential decision to open an additional 
appropriation in the budget of the State for the financial year 2013/2014  of about 29.738 LE 
billions for the implementation of the stimulating program.  
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The main objectives of the paper are: First: Investigating the potential contribution of the 
stimulus package program to economic growth both in the  immediate and long run; as far as I 
know no empirical research has been conducted to investigate this potential impact. Second: 
Identifying promising investments that might have a significant contribution to growth and result 
in a high fiscal multiplier. Third: Providing policy recommendations for decision makers. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section Two: covers the literature review and theoretical 
background. Section Three: explores problems facing the Egyptian economy, whether is there a 
room for government intervention, and the prerequisites for the effectiveness of economic aids. 
Section Four: explains econometric methodology. Section Five: includes empirical results. 
Section Six: is the conclusion and policy recommendations.  
 
2. Literature Review& Theoretical Background:  
There is an extensive empirical literature on the multiplier effect of fiscal policy. The empirical 
research on the impact of government expenditure on economic growth can be grouped into two 
main strands. While the first strand focuses on the effects of the overall government expenditures 
on economic growth, the second tries to differentiate the impact of different types of government 
expenditures on economic growth. 
 
As for the first strand of literature, although several studies have investigated the relationship 
between government expenditure and economic growth using different methodologies, yet the 
results are inconclusive. Some studies concluded the existence of anegative relationship between 
government expenditure and economic growth such as Landau (1983);  Barro (1989); Romer, 
1990; Alexander, 1990; Folster and Henrekson, 1999, and  Josaphat et al. (2000).  Niloy et al. 
(2003) examined the effect of government expenditure for a panel of thirty developing countries 
over the period 1970-80 , they concluded  the esxistence of a positive and significant correlation 
between both government capital expenditure-to-GDP ratio and economic growth, but current 
expenditure was not found to have a significant effect on growth ( Alshahrani and Alsad, 2014). 
 
As for the second strand of literature, it is known that the composition of the program can have a 
substantial impact on the outcomes or the effectiveness of the program, this has been confirmed 
by empirical studies. Cullison (1993) analyzed the impact of government spending on education 
and labor training, found a statistically significant impact for them on future economic growth, 
furthermore the reduction of defense spending by 20% and apportioning the proceeds between 
debt reduction and spending on education and training can result in higher levels of real private 
GDP than what would have resulted without reductions in defense spending. Bertrand and 
Mamatzakis (2001) tested the impact of investment in infrastructural projects on long-run 
economic growth rates in South Africa and Chile and found positive growth impacts. Using a 
similar methodology, M’Amanja and Morrissey (2005), using data covering the period (1964-
2002), reached the same conclusion for the Kenyan case. Leduc and Wilson (2012) showed that 
transportation spending can be associated with larger economic benefits than other types of 
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government spending which generally do not increase the productivity of private sector 
production ( Alshahrani and Alsad, 2014).  
There are myriad of methodologies that can be used to estimate the size of the fiscal multiplier, 
such as: i. Model Simulations: models with an ISLM structure and little or no forward looking 
behavior result in positive multipliers by construction. ii. Case Studies: the main drawback of 
this approach is that the results are specific to the type of fiscal measure “shock” studied, the 
prevailing macroeconomic conditions at the time of implementation. iii. Vector Auto-
Regression models (VAR): it is useful to correctly identify and track the impact of an 
exogenous movement in public expenditure or taxes. VARs give the response of the economy to 
a specific shock using relatively simple tools such as the impulse response functions (IRFs) and 
variance decompositions (VDs). The main criticism to this approach is that the fiscal policy 
decisions are usually announced by the fiscal authorities, so the response to the expected shock 
may occur before the decisions are actually set in place. iv. Econometric studies of consumer 
behavior: they focus on the response of consumption to the change in income as a result of a 
specific fiscal shock (Spilimbergo et al. 2009). The size of the fiscal multiplier is of great 
importance, as it gives signs concerning the potential effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating 
the economy. Empirical studies reached different estimates for the size of the fiscal multiplier 
due to differences in econometric methodologies used; examples are in the following table: 
 
Table 1: Estimates of the Public Investment Multipliers in the Literature: 
Publication Country Multiplier Methodology Description 
Hida, et.al. 
(2008) 
Japan 1.1 Error Correction 
Model 
Multiplier 
(Maximum) 
Perotti (2004) Australia 
Canada 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
Untied States 
1.07 
0.74 
5.46 
0.16 
1.68 
VAR - quarterly 
 
 
Multiplier 
(Maximum, 
Cumulative) 
 
Afonso and 
Aubyn (2008) 
France 
Germany 
Canada 
United Kingdom 
Japan 
United States 
1.5 
1.7 
-2.3 
-1.6 
.014 
1.8 
VAR - annual 
 
 
Multiplier  
Cumulative 
(Marginal  
Productivity) 
 
Freedman, 
Kumhof, 
Laxton and Lee 
(2009) 
United States 
 
1.8 Dynamic Neo-
Keynesian  
Model 
Multiplier Period 
1 
 
  Source: Brückner, M and Tuladhar, A. April 2010. “Public Investment as a Fiscal Stimulus:  Evidence from 
Japan’s Regional Spending During the 1990s”.  IMF Working Paper No. 10/110. 
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The fiscal multiplier is theoretically defined as the proportional change in output (ΔY) to an 
exogenous change in a particular fiscal variable such as government expenditure, taxes, transfer 
payments or other fiscal policy variables with respect to their respective baselines. Depending on 
the time frame considered when analyzing the impact of the fiscal policy on output and growth, 
there are three main types for the fiscal multipliers, which are (Spilimbergo, et.al, 2009): 
 
1. The Impact “Short run” Multiplier (IM): which reflects the elasticity of output to 
the fiscal policy variable of concern “government expenditure” at the impact period, 
it could be expressed as: 
 
IM =𝚫𝒚(𝒕)
𝚫𝑮(𝒕) 
 
2. The Peak Multiplier (PM): indicates the maximum expected response of output in 
the initial booming phase of the boom-bust cycle, it could be expressed as: 
 
PM= 𝐦𝐚𝐱𝑵 𝚫𝒚(𝒕+𝑵)𝚫𝑮(𝒕)  
 
3. The Cumulative “Long run” Multiplier (CM): it is the cumulative changes in 
output over time divided by the cumulative changes in government spending. The 
rationale behind the long-run multiplier is that government expenditure may be 
persistent and may trigger output responses in several time periods after the initial 
shock, as in the standard Keynesian IS-LM model where the multiplier is the infinite 
sum of the incremental changes in output in each period after the shock (Wang and 
Wen, 2013). It could be expressed as: 
CM= ∑ 𝚫𝒚(𝒕+𝑵)𝑵𝒋=𝟎
∑ 𝚫𝑮(𝒕+𝑵)𝑵𝒋=𝟎  
 
Concerning the determinants of the fiscal multiplier, there are three main factors that affect the 
size of the fiscal multiplier, such as: i. The size of leakages: the relative size of leakages of the 
stimulating funds from the income –expenditure circular flow in the economy should be 
minimized to guarantee the effectiveness of government expenditure, this could be achieved 
when the marginal propensity to consume (save and import) is large (small). ii. Monetary 
Policy: coordination between monetary and fiscal policies is crucial in order to avoid 
contradiction; the multiplier effect of government expenditure on output will be large if the 
monetary policy is accommodative and the nominal interest rate does not increase in response to 
fiscal expansion, to avoid the crowding out effect. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009) 
ensured the importance of the zero lower Bound for interest rate, as the multiplier should be 
large when monetary policy has hit the lower zero bound. iii. Fiscal Sustainability: fiscal 
expansions can be contractionary if they reduce consumers’ and investors’ confidence in 
government economic policies, especially if the fiscal expansion raises fiscal sustainability 
concerns; as it would lead to high risk premium on government debt, hence crowding out the 
private investment; that’s why the sources of finance are important to consider when the stimulus 
plan is designed (Spilimbergo et.al, 2009). 
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Brückner and Tuladhar (2010) estimated both short run and long run fiscal multipliers for Japan, 
their estimates were about 0.28 and 0.56, respectively. They justified the lower size of multiplier 
estimates by the existence of a significant crowding out effect for public investment on private 
consumption; as a 1 percent increase in public investment was found to decrease private 
consumption by 0.1 percent. 
 
 
3. Is there a need for a Marshall Plan in the Egyptian Economy? 
 
3.1.1. Challenges Facing The Egyptian Economy: 
 
It has been three years since the outbreak of the January 25th revolution, which was mainly fueled 
by economic and social needs of the Egyptian citizens; as Egyptians were suffering higher levels 
of unemployment, miserable social status and inequality in income distribution in society due to 
the lack of well-designed social policies that could have guaranteed pro-poor growth. Marotta et 
al. (2011) examined the relationship between growth and poverty in Egypt for the period (2005 – 
2008), they concluded that only 45 percent of the population in Egypt remained consistently out 
of poverty throughout the period, while the remaining 55 percent of Egyptians experienced at 
least one near-poverty episode. 
 
After the January 25threvolution, no effective economic policies were actually set in place to 
improve the economic and social conditions in Egypt, to be felt by lower and middle classes. 
Inferior economic conditions in Egypt are reflected in macroeconomic fundamentals such as: a. 
Lower economic growth rates that reached 2.4 percent in 2012/2013. b. Low investment rate 
triggered by the lack of security and political instability, which reached 13.3% in 2012/13. c. 
High unemployment rate; the overall unemployment rate reached 13%  2011/12, and 
unemployment rate among university graduates recorded 30.1 percent by the end of March 2013. 
d. High poverty headcount ratio, which reached 25.2% in 2010/11. e. Deterioration in net 
international reserves; which reached to a critical level of US$ 15.53 billion in 2012, but thanks 
to the economic aids received from Arab Gulf States after June 2013 they have recorded US$ 
17.03 billion by the end of December 20131. f. Real public investment- GDP ratio has been 
declining over time; it dropped to 5.72 percent in 2012/13. g. A considerable increase in overall 
government budget deficit-GDP ratio, which reached 13.7 percent in 2012/13 (See figures 1-7 
below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 More details about the composition of economic aids received recently from the Arab Gulf States will be 
mentioned later on in this section in the context of the Egyptian fiscal stimulus package program. 
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Figure 1: Real Economic Growth Rates in Egypt (2007/08 - 2012/13) 
 
 
Source: Ministry of planning.  Indicators Report Q4 & 2012/2013. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Investment Rates in Egypt (2007/08 - 2012/13) 
 
 
Source: Ministry of planning.  Indicators Report Q4 & 2012/2013. 
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Figure 3: Unemployment Rates in Egypt (2007/08 - 2011/12) 
 
 
Source: Ministry of planning.  Indicators Report Q4 & 2012/2013. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Poverty Headcount Ratio in Egypt (2007/08 - 2011/12) 
 
 
Source: Ministry of planning.  Indicators Report Q4 & 2012/2013. 
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Figure 5: Net International Reserves (2008 – Dec-13) 
 
 
Source: CBE Annual Reports. 
 
 
Figure 6: Real Public Investment-GDP Ratio in Egypt (2002-2012) 
 
 
Source: Researcher calculations based on data on GDP and public investment at current prices, obtained 
from the Ministry of planning Indicators Report Q4 & 2012/2013. 
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Figure 7: Government Overall Budget Deficit-GDP % (2008-2012) 
  
 
Source: Ministry of Finance. Monthly Budget performance Reports. 
http://www.mof.gov.eg/MOFGallerySource/English/Monthly-Budget-Performance.pdf 
 
 
Given the previously mentioned economic challenges, it could have been difficult for the 
government to follow a tightened budget constraint or to reduce public expenditure on certain 
sectors. Also certain procedures which are crucial to ensure fiscal discipline such as the 
restructuring of the subsidy system and the gradual reduction of energy subsidies to energy-
intensive industries due to resistance of interest groups. Whose power is relatively large due to 
the slowdown of economic activity. That’s why the Egyptian government should have been 
resort to policies that can stimulate economic activity, recently Egypt received economic aids 
from the Arab Gulf States after June 2013 of about US$ 12, the decomposition of these funds can 
be summarized in the following table: 
Table 2: Economic Aids to Egypt from Arab Gulf States after June, 2013 
Economic Aids Saudi Arabia Kuwait United Arab Emirates Total 
Petroleum Products 2 1 - 3 
Deposits 2 2 2 6 
Grants (Cash) 1 1 1 3 
Total 5 4 3 12 
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The Egyptian government announced the implementation of a fiscal stimulus package program, 
according to the Presidential Decree under Law No. 105 of 20132, of about LE 29.738 billion to 
implement some economic and social programs to stimulate the Egyptian economy.  
As for the composition of the fiscal stimulus package that was announced by the Egyptian 
government,  
Figure 8: The composition of the Fiscal Stimulus Package: 
 Source: Ministry of Finance. 
  
3.1.2.  The effectiveness of Economic Aids: 
There has been a strong debate in the literature concerning the effectiveness of foreign aid in 
promoting growth. On one hand, several empirical studies found a positive relationship between 
aid and economic growth such as Dalgaard and Hansen (2000); Hansen and Tarp (2000); 
Lensink and White (2001), and Clemens et al (2004). Aid can have a positive relationship with 
growth on average across countries, but with diminishing returns as the volume of aid increases. 
There are three main channels through which aid promotes growth because: i. Aid augments 
savings, finances investment, and adds to the capital stock. ii. Aid increases worker productivity 
through investments in health and education.  iii. Aid promotes the transfer of technology or 
knowledge from donor to the recipient countries. On the other hand, aid might have no effect on 
                                                          
2 According to the Presidential Decree under Law No. 105 of 2013: The Central Bank of Egypt purchases the funds 
receives in foreign exchange and an equivalent amount of about LE 60.785 billion should be added to the account of 
the Egyptian ministry of finance, to be used as follows: First: 29.738 billion pounds to be used to open an additional 
provision for the general budget of the state to implement economic and social programs to stimulate the Egyptian 
economy. Second: The rest of the Egyptian pound equivalent amount is added to the balance of the interim accounts 
of the Ministry of Finance to contribute to the reduction of the budget deficit. 
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growth and may actually undermine growth due to:  i. Corruption. ii. Poor economic policies and 
the moral hazard problem as policy makers may rely on these funds as interim solutions to 
certain economic and financial problems rather than implementing certain reforms in economic 
policies. iv. Aid can reduce both domestic private and public saving (Chowdhury and Garonna, 
2007).  
In fact, there are critical factors that determine the effectiveness of economic aids which are: i. 
The characteristics of the recipient country: empirical research found that aid can accelerate 
growth only in countries with sound macroeconomic policies, the terms of trade, and institutional 
quality. (Burnside and Dollar 2004, Collier and Hoeffler 2002, and Radelet 2006). ii. Practices 
and procedures adopted by the donors: it is argued that aid can be more effective if there were 
greater country ownership and participation among government and community groups or civil 
society in recipient countries in setting priorities and designing programs. iii. Type of activity 
supported by aids: empirical studies found that aids for health and education might only affect 
growth in the long run “after a time lag”, while aids for infrastructural projects such as building 
roads, ports, and agriculture may have a direct positive affect on growth (Chowdhury and 
Garonna, 2007). 
 
It is worth mentioning that the lack of an attractive business environment can weaken the 
positive impact of stimulus programs as it discourages private investment, Egypt’s rank in the 
Doing Business in Egypt 2014 subnational report recorded 128 (World Bank, 2013) this can also 
have a detrimental effect on the competitiveness of the Egyptian economy3. Also, uncertainty in 
economic policies can have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the fiscal policy in 
stimulating economic growth, which is actually the case in the Egyptian economy, as the 
consumer confidence index (CCI) of economic performance dropped by 3.9% between (April – 
May) 2013 which was associated with a decline in other sub-indices such as expected better 
standard of living for the Egyptian households and confidence in economic policies.(IDSC. 
2013). 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
3According to the Doing Business in Egypt 2014 subnational report: “A strong correlation exists between Doing 
Business rankings and World Economic Forum rankings on global competitiveness for Egypt”. It means that there is 
appositive statistical correlation between an enhancing business environment and competitiveness. 
13 
 
4. Econometric Analysis: 
 
4.1.1. Empirical Models: 
In order to empirically estimate the fiscal multiplier, I will use the Vector Auto-Regression 
(VAR) methodology.  I will use two models, while the first focuses on the effects of total 
government expenditures on economic growth, the second differentiates the impact of different 
types of government expenditures on economic growth.   
  
Model 1:  will include the following variables:  
• RGDPG: Real GDP growth rate. 
• RPUBINVESTGDP: real public investment-GDP ratio.  
• RPRINVESTGDP: real private investment-GDP ratio. 
• PRCONSGDP: Real private consumption-GDP ratio. 
• NEXPGDP: Real exports-to-GDP ratio in real terms. 
 
Model 2: this model differentiates the impact of different types of government expenditures on 
economic growth, public investment will be decomposed into four main groups as follows: 
• Agricultural Investment. 
• Livelihood Investment: this category includes (water- health - education – sewerage- 
electricity- Real estate and housing- natural gas- insurance& social security- other social 
services). 
• Industrial investment: this category includes (Suez canal- manufacturing – 
transportation- communication- information- Oil& Mining). 
• Other investment: this category includes (Restaurants& hotels- financial intermediaries 
& supporting services - internal trade). 
This model will include the following variables: 
• RGDPG: Real GDP growth rate. 
• RPUBINVESTGDP: will be decomposed into: (RAGRICGDP – RINDUSGDP – 
ROTHGDP – RLIVGDP), these are the real investment -GDP ratios for the investment 
categories previously mentioned.  
• RPRINVESTGDP: real private investment-GDP ratio. 
• PRCONSGDP: Real private consumption-GDP ratio. 
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4.1.2. Data: 
Data is covering the period (1982-2012). Following Alshaharani and Alsadiq (2014), data for all 
variables are obtained in nominal terms from the Egyptian Ministry of Planning, and then 
deflated using the GDP deflator obtained from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database. 
 
4.1.3. Econometric Methodology: 
The Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) methodology will be used to estimate the size of the fiscal 
multiplier in the Egyptian economy. (VAR) is a set of dynamic equations, in which each variable 
is specified as a function of an equal number of lags of itself and all other variables in the 
system.  
 
The estimation of the fiscal multiplier can be accomplished into four steps, which are: 
 
1. Testing for unit roots: All the variables should be tested for stationary before the 
estimation of the model, in order to avoid a spurious regression problem, Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) Unit Root test will be used. 
2. VAR estimation: All the variables should be entered in their stationary states. The lag 
length for the model will be determined using information criteria such as Akaike and 
Schwarz information criterion, and then the model will be estimated by the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) method. 
3. Diagnostic Checks: diagnostic tests should be applied to ensure the reliability of the 
results and estimates derived. The LM test for autocorrelation, hetroscedasticity, as well 
as stability tests should be applied  to make sure that the model does not suffer any 
problems and to ensure the robustness of the results.  
4. Deriving elasticity and multiplier estimates: After the VAR model is estimated, both 
Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) and Cumulative Impulse Response Functions 
(CIRFs) can be used to identify both short, medium, and long term elasticities of 
economic growth and other variables of interest to public investment. The fiscal 
multiplier can be estimated by multiplying the elasticity of economic growth to public 
investment by the inverse of public investment-to-GDP ratio; then Impact, Peak, and 
Cumulative multipliers can be derived. 
 
5. Results: 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Unit Root test was used to test for the stationarity of all 
variables that would be used in the two models. All variables were found to be integrated of 
order one, with the exception of public investment components which are integrated of order 
zero. Results can be summarized in the following table, for more details see tables (1-5) & (12-
15) at the appendix: 
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Table 3: Results for ADF unit root test for all variables: 
Source: Researcher’s calculations. 
For the estimation of VAR models, annual time series were used to guarantee the accuracy of the 
multiplier estimates especially in the long run. Concerning the lag length, only 2 lags were 
included in the following model, and one lag was included in the second VAR model (See tables 
(6-16) at the appendix). In model two we excluded NEXPGDP for estimation purposes due to 
data limitations. Diagnostic tests were applied for both models to ensure the reliability of the 
multiplier estimates that will be derived. Both models don not suffer any hetroscedasticity, 
autocorrelation or stability problems. Summary results for these tests can be summarized in the 
following table, for more details see tables (7-9) & (17-19) at the appendix: 
Table 4: Diagnostic Tests: 
Test Model 1 Model 2 
Test Statistic P-value Test Statistic P-value 
Residual Serial 
Correlation LM Test 24.24 0.50 52.36 0.344 
Residual 
Heteroskedasticity 
Tests 304.72 0.413 406 0.302 
Stability Test VAR satisfies the 
stability condition 
No root lies 
outside the unit 
circle 
VAR satisfies the 
stability condition 
No root lies 
outside the unit 
circle 
Residual Normality 
Tests (Jarque Bera) 
 5.75 0.835 304.04 0.00 
Source: Researcher’s calculations. 
  
Variable Order of Integration t-Statistic Significance Level 
RGDPG I(1) -5.067 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 
RPUBINVESTGDP I(1) -7.647 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 
RAGRICGDP I(0) -4.635 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 
RINDUSGDP I(0) -4.615 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 
RLIVGDP I(0) -3.481 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 
ROTHGDP I(0) -3.604 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 
RPRINVESTGDP I(1) -5.888 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 
PRCONSGDP I(1) -4.681 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 
NEXPGDP I(1) -9.137 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 
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Elasticity Estimates: 
The elasticity estimates for both models can be derived based on Impulse Response Functions 
(IRFs), which indicate the response of different variables to a one standard deviation shock to the 
variable of interest. IRFs for model 1 are in table 10 at the appendix, estimates of short, medium, 
and long term elasticities can be summarized in the following table: 
Table 5: Elasticity Estimates for model 1: 
Variable Short- term 
Elasticity 
Medium-term 
Elasticity 
Long-term Elasticity 
RGDPG 0.083 0.223 0.053 
RPRCONSGDP -0.096 -0.187 -0.067 
RPRINVESTGDP 0.957 -0.028 0.057 
NEXPGDP 0.287 1.404 0.316 
Source: Researcher’s calculations. 
As for model 1, Economic growth was found to be positively inelastic to public investment, 
private consumption is negatively inelastic to public investment, private investment is negatively 
(positively) inelastic to public investment in the medium (short and long) terms, but is positively 
inelastic in both short and long terms. Net exports are positively inelastic (elastic) to public 
investment in both short and long (medium) terms.  It means that public investment is expected 
to stimulate a economic growth and boost exports, while uncertainty and the lack of confidence 
in economic policies can have to a negative impact on private consumption.  This may be 
justified by the fact that in case of unstable macroeconomic environment and volatile inflation 
rates may induce households to increase savings by precautionary motive. The response of 
economic growth, private consumption, private investment, and net exports to public investment 
can be easily visualized by the following figure. 
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Figure 9: Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) for Model (1):  
 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations. 
 
IRFs for model 2 are in table 20 at the appendix, estimates of short, medium, and long term 
elasticities of economic growth, private consumption, and private investment to livelihood, 
agricultural, industrial, and other investments. The response of economic growth, private 
consumption, private investment, and net exports to these different categories of public 
investment can be easily visualized by the following figure. Elasticity estimates can also be 
summarized in the following tables:  
Table 6: Elasticity estimates with respect to Livelihood Investment: 
Variable Short- term 
Elasticity 
Medium-term 
Elasticity 
Long-term Elasticity 
RGDPG  0.680 -0.051 -0.002 
RPRCONSGDP  0.067 -0.073  0.002 
RPRINVESTGDP  0.054  0.011 -0.008 
Source: Researcher’s calculations. 
Concerning the response of economic growth,  private consumption, and private investment to 
livelihood investments, it is evident that livelihood investments can have a positive impact on the 
three variables mentioned earlier in the short run, while it effect may turn around to be negative 
in the medium-to-long run due to uncertainty and lack of confidence in macroeconomic 
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performance which discourage private consumption, private investment, hence have a negative 
impact on economic growth rates. 
Table 7: Elasticity estimates with respect to Agricultural Investment: 
Variable Short- term 
Elasticity 
Medium-term 
Elasticity 
Long-term Elasticity 
RGDPG -0.076 -0.040 -0.051 
RPRCONSGDP -0.329 -0.308 -0.188 
RPRINVESTGDP  0.179  0.059  0.018 
Source: Researcher’s calculations. 
Concerning the response of economic growth, private consumption, and private investment to 
agricultural investments, it is evident that public investment in the agriculture sector does not 
contribute positively to economic growth. This may be justified by inequality in land ownership 
which is a common phenomenon in developing countries, due to the lack of a well- designed and 
a targeting investment strategy in the agriculture sector. Nin-Pratt (2011) concluded that an 
efficiently targeting allocation of agricultural R&D investment across regions can play an 
important role in alleviating poverty. However, it contributes positively to private investment, 
may be because it enables firms to bur raw materials at lower costs. 
 
Table 8: Elasticity estimates with respect to Industrial Investment: 
Variable Short- term 
Elasticity 
Medium-term 
Elasticity 
Long-term Elasticity 
RGDPG  0.011  0.030 -0.002 
RPRCONSGDP  0.354 -0.018 -0.029 
RPRINVESTGDP -0.298  0.076  0.003 
Source: Researcher’s calculations. 
Concerning the response of economic growth, private consumption, and private investment to 
industrial investments, it is evident that industrial investment can have a positive impact on 
economic growth in short and medium terms, but it may have a small negative impact on the 
long run. Private consumption is expected to respond positively (negatively) in the short 
(medium and long) run, while private investment responds negatively (positively) to public 
industrial investment in the short (medium and long) run. All these results ensure that fact that 
uncertainty, political instability, and institutional constraints can all have negative impact on 
these variables, so harming economic growth in the long run. 
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Table 9: Elasticity estimates with respect to Other Investment: 
Variable Short- term 
Elasticity 
Medium-term 
Elasticity 
Long-term Elasticity 
RGDPG -0.041749  0.009 -0.003648 
RPRCONSGDP -0.164909 -0.023 -0.026514 
RPRINVESTGDP -0.360614  0.043  0.003254 
Source: Researcher’s calculations. 
It is obvious that other investments such as public investments in Restaurants & hotels, financial 
intermediaries & supporting services, and  internal trade cannot contribute significantly to 
economic growth. 
  Figure 10: Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) for Model (2):  
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations. 
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To sum up, both livelihood and industrial investments are expected to boost economic growth, as 
livelihood investments such as investments in health and education can improve labor 
productivity and improve the country’s competitiveness, hence positively contributing to 
economic growth. Industrial investment in information & communication technology is expected 
to lay the ground for private investment.   
Multiplier Estimates: 
The fiscal multiplier can be estimated by multiplying the elasticity of economic growth to public 
investment by the inverse of public investment-to-GDP ratio; then Impact, Peak, and Cumulative 
multipliers can be derived. The average public investment-GDP ratio during the period (1882- 
2012) is about 13.28 percent, then the fiscal multipliers can be derived as follows: 
1. The Impact multiplier (IM): 
Since the elasticity of economic growth to public investment in the second period year) 
following the shock is 0.083, so the impact “short-run” multiplier IM is expected to be 0.625, 
which is acceptable.  Spilimbergo et al. (2009) found that, as a rule of thumb,  the size of fiscal 
multiplier may range between 1 and 1.5 for large economies, between 0.5 and 1 for medium 
sized economies, and 0.5 or less for small open countries. 
2. The Peak Multiplier (PM): 
Since the maximum expected elasticity of GDP to public investment in the 10 -years period 
following the shock is0.223, so the peak multiplier PM is expected to equal 1.68. 
3. The Cumulative/Long-rum Multiplier (CM): 
Since the cumulative elasticity of GDP to public investment, in the 8th year following the shock, 
is 0.21, CIRFs for model 2 are at table 10 at the appendix, so the cumulative “long-run” 
multiplier CM is expected to equal 1.58. 
Concerning the potential contribution of the stimulus package implemented by the Egyptian 
government to economic growth 3F4.  Real GDP growth rate in 2012/13 recorded 2.1 percent. In the 
short-run, this fiscal stimulus program is expected to boost real economic growth rate by 0.61 
percent; real economic growth rate is expected to reach 2.71 percent 4F5. Long-run economic 
growth rate is expected to reach 2.6 percent. This effect should be expected because the size of 
the fiscal stimulus program is not too large; it is only about 1.61 percent of GDP 5F6.  
                                                          
4 I will consider only the impact of public investment on economic growth, excluding funds that were used for 
salaries and wages and compensations for employees, of about LE 2.6 billion. The impact of LE  27.09 billion is 
investigated. 
5 Changes in output can be calculated as : ∆ Y = ∆ PubInvest . Multiplier. 
6 Brückner and Tuladhar (2010) estimates for both short run and long run fiscal multipliers for Japan were about 
0.28 and 0.56, respectively. Although the Fiscal stimulus-GDP ratio in Japan over the period (1992- 2008) was 
about 2.3 percent, on average. 
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This may justify the government’s tendency to implement a second fiscal stimulus package, to be 
highly concentrating on infrastructural projects “among livelihood investments” due to their 
strong contribution to economic growth, this is in line with the results that we reached as 
livelihood investments were found to have a relatively high positive impact on economic growth 
in the short run than other categories of public investment. According to the initial 
announcements released by government officials recently, the second stimulus package will be 
expected to be of LE30 billion. If this package will focus on public investment rather than being 
directed to salary adjustments, it would be expected to boost short- run economic growth by 0.90 
percent, and to boost long-run economic growth by 0.73 percent.  It means that the two stimulus 
packages jointly will be expected to boost short-run economic growth by 1.51 percent, and to 
boost long-run economic growth by 1.2 percent.  
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications: 
 
It has been three years since the outbreak of the January 25threvolution, no effective economic 
policies were actually set in place to improve the economic and social conditions in Egypt, to be 
felt by lower and middle classes. The Egyptian economy has been suffering lower economic 
growth rates that reached 2.4 percent in 2012/2013, low investment rate triggered by the lack of 
security and political instability, which reached 13.3% in 2012/13, High unemployment rate 
among university graduates recorded 30.1 percent by the end of March 2013, and high poverty 
headcount ratio, which reached 25.2% in 2010/11. Political instability over the past three years 
worked as a push factor to capital inflows, which led to the deterioration of international 
reserves; which reached to a critical level of US$ 15.53 billion in 2012. However, thanks to the 
economic aids received from Arab Gulf States after June 2013 have recorded US$ 17.03 billion 
by the end of December 2013. In order to stimulate the economy, the government announced the 
frst stimulus package program, of about LE 29.738 billion. I estimated the elasticity of economic 
growth to public investment and four main public investment categories, both livelihood and 
industrial investments are expected to boost economic growth.  
The size of the fiscal multiplier is this study is in line with those reached by other empirical 
studies for medium sized and small open economies. The impact “short-run” multiplier is 
expected to be 0.625, the peak multiplier is expected to equal 1.68, and the cumulative “long-
run” multiplier is expected to equal 1.58. In the short-run, the fiscal stimulus program is expected 
to boost real economic growth rate by 0.61 percent; real economic growth rate is expected to 
reach 2.71 percent. Long-run economic growth rate is expected to reach 2.6 percent. If the 
second stimulus package is to be implemented, the   short-run economic growth rate will be 
expected to reach 3.62 percent, also the long-run economic growth rate is expected to record 3.3 
percent. The Egyptian government has to implement a set of reforms such as restructuring the 
subsidy system, encouraging the informal sector to formalize, providing incentives to the private 
sector, achieve political stability and security to attract foreign direct investment, and enhancing 
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the business environment. All these reforms are crucial for better economic performance, which 
in turn can reduce uncertainty and guarantee the effectiveness of fiscal policy.    
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Appendix 
ADF unit root tests for model 1:  
 
 Table 1: RGDPG  is I(1) 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(RGDPG) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=2) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.067449  0.0017 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.309824  
 5% level  -3.574244  
 10% level  -3.221728  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RGDPG,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/26/14   Time: 09:59   
Sample (adjusted): 1984 2012   
Included observations: 29 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(RGDPG(-1)) -0.966178 0.190664 -5.067449 0.0000 
C -0.434490 0.580122 -0.748963 0.4606 
@TREND(1982) 0.013202 0.032116 0.411089 0.6844 
     
     R-squared 0.499745    Mean dependent var -0.039345 
Adjusted R-squared 0.461264    S.D. dependent var 1.970743 
S.E. of regression 1.446499    Akaike info criterion 3.673866 
Sum squared resid 54.40133    Schwarz criterion 3.815311 
Log likelihood -50.27106    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.718165 
F-statistic 12.98676    Durbin-Watson stat 1.968200 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000123    
     
      
 
Table 2: RPrconsgdp is I(1) 
Null Hypothesis: D(RPRCONSGDP) has a unit root 
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=2) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.681802  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.647120  
 5% level  -1.952910  
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Table 3: Rpubinvestgdp  is I(1) 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(RPUBINVESTGDP) has a unit root 
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=2) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.647836  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.647120  
 5% level  -1.952910  
 10% level  -1.610011  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RPUBINVESTGDP,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/26/14   Time: 10:01   
Sample (adjusted): 1984 2012   
Included observations: 29 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(RPUBINVESTGDP(-1)) -1.345919 0.175987 -7.647836 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.676231    Mean dependent var 0.034530 
Adjusted R-squared 0.676231    S.D. dependent var 3.658416 
S.E. of regression 2.081664    Akaike info criterion 4.338087 
Sum squared resid 121.3332    Schwarz criterion 4.385235 
 10% level  -1.610011  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RPRCONSGDP,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/26/14   Time: 09:50   
Sample (adjusted): 1984 2012   
Included observations: 29 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(RPRCONSGDP(-1)) -0.874531 0.186794 -4.681802 0.0001 
     
     R-squared 0.439071    Mean dependent var -0.016223 
Adjusted R-squared 0.439071    S.D. dependent var 2.565031 
S.E. of regression 1.921084    Akaike info criterion 4.177531 
Sum squared resid 103.3358    Schwarz criterion 4.224679 
Log likelihood -59.57420    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.192297 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.983872    
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Log likelihood -61.90226    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.352853 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.156474    
     
      
Table 4: Rprinvestgdp I(1) 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(RPRINVESTGDP) has a unit root 
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=2) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.888628  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.647120  
 5% level  -1.952910  
 10% level  -1.610011  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RPRINVESTGDP,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/26/14   Time: 09:57   
Sample (adjusted): 1984 2012   
Included observations: 29 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(RPRINVESTGDP(-1)) -1.112540 0.188930 -5.888628 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.553232    Mean dependent var -0.023910 
Adjusted R-squared 0.553232    S.D. dependent var 3.234140 
S.E. of regression 2.161721    Akaike info criterion 4.413561 
Sum squared resid 130.8451    Schwarz criterion 4.460709 
Log likelihood -62.99663    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.428327 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.013210    
     
      
Table 5: NEXPGDP is  I(1) 
Null Hypothesis: D(NEXPGDP) has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=2) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -9.137762  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.647120  
 5% level  -1.952910  
 10% level  -1.610011  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(NEXPGDP,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/26/14   Time: 12:14   
Sample (adjusted): 1984 2012   
Included observations: 29 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(NEXPGDP(-1)) -1.515125 0.165809 -9.137762 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.748784    Mean dependent var 0.341338 
Adjusted R-squared 0.748784    S.D. dependent var 18.11881 
S.E. of regression 9.081417    Akaike info criterion 7.284212 
Sum squared resid 2309.220    Schwarz criterion 7.331360 
Log likelihood -104.6211    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.298978 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.239669    
     
      
Table 6: VAR model 1 : 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates    
 Date: 01/28/14   Time: 14:24    
 Sample (adjusted): 1985 2012    
 Included observations: 28 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      
 D(RGDPG,1) 
D(RPRCONSG
DP,1) 
D(RPUBINVES
TGDP,1) 
D(RPRINVEST
GDP,1) D(NEXPGDP,1) 
      
      D(RGDPG(-1),1)  0.251881 -0.086726 -0.427242  0.423551  1.200300 
  (0.26300)  (0.41454)  (0.39432)  (0.43697)  (1.63869) 
 [ 0.95773] [-0.20921] [-1.08348] [ 0.96929] [ 0.73248] 
      
D(RGDPG(-2),1)  0.382717  0.015338  0.471967 -0.277600  2.274481 
  (0.24690)  (0.38917)  (0.37019)  (0.41023)  (1.53839) 
 [ 1.55008] [ 0.03941] [ 1.27494] [-0.67670] [ 1.47848] 
      
D(RPRCONSGDP(-1),1) -0.218254  0.147899  0.217247  0.097944 -1.777099 
  (0.16363)  (0.25791)  (0.24533)  (0.27187)  (1.01952) 
 [-1.33386] [ 0.57345] [ 0.88553] [ 0.36027] [-1.74307] 
      
D(RPRCONSGDP(-2),1)  0.241496 -0.010256 -0.339245 -0.142585  1.574144 
  (0.19346)  (0.30494)  (0.29007)  (0.32144)  (1.20544) 
 [ 1.24827] [-0.03363] [-1.16953] [-0.44358] [ 1.30587] 
      
D(RPUBINVESTGDP(-1),1)  0.130564 -0.008416 -0.399225  0.517796  0.878000 
  (0.16393)  (0.25839)  (0.24579)  (0.27237)  (1.02141) 
 [ 0.79647] [-0.03257] [-1.62428] [ 1.90108] [ 0.85960] 
      
D(RPUBINVESTGDP(-2),1)  0.081596  0.117517 -0.145454  0.183691 -0.348867 
  (0.17438)  (0.27486)  (0.26146)  (0.28974)  (1.08654) 
 [ 0.46791] [ 0.42755] [-0.55632] [ 0.63399] [-0.32108] 
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D(RPRINVESTGDP(-1),1) -0.000940  0.142462 -0.042566  0.011281 -0.579809 
  (0.15525)  (0.24470)  (0.23277)  (0.25794)  (0.96731) 
 [-0.00606] [ 0.58218] [-0.18287] [ 0.04373] [-0.59940] 
      
D(RPRINVESTGDP(-2),1)  0.061941 -0.023839  0.055481 -0.080234  0.031135 
  (0.15259)  (0.24052)  (0.22879)  (0.25353)  (0.95076) 
 [ 0.40593] [-0.09911] [ 0.24250] [-0.31647] [ 0.03275] 
      
D(NEXPGDP(-1),1) -0.076192  0.011384  0.016968 -0.017196 -0.823142 
  (0.04122)  (0.06497)  (0.06180)  (0.06849)  (0.25684) 
 [-1.84840] [ 0.17522] [ 0.27455] [-0.25108] [-3.20492] 
      
D(NEXPGDP(-2),1) -0.063157  0.045249 -0.003943  0.048471 -0.483219 
  (0.04141)  (0.06527)  (0.06208)  (0.06880)  (0.25800) 
 [-1.52524] [ 0.69328] [-0.06351] [ 0.70453] [-1.87292] 
      
C -0.075506  0.589432 -0.728966  0.270388 -0.559057 
  (0.32540)  (0.51291)  (0.48789)  (0.54066)  (2.02753) 
 [-0.23204] [ 1.14920] [-1.49412] [ 0.50011] [-0.27573] 
      
       R-squared  0.396395  0.125964  0.442193  0.312011  0.587758 
 Adj. R-squared  0.041333 -0.388175  0.114072 -0.092688  0.345263 
 Sum sq. resids  32.84103  81.59247  73.82720  90.66069  1274.981 
 S.E. equation  1.389901  2.190789  2.083933  2.309325  8.660188 
 F-statistic  1.116412  0.244999  1.347650  0.770970  2.423794 
 Log likelihood -41.96292 -54.70373 -53.30360 -56.17915 -93.18902 
 Akaike AIC  3.783066  4.693124  4.593114  4.798511  7.442073 
 Schwarz SC  4.306432  5.216490  5.116480  5.321877  7.965439 
 Mean dependent -0.207357  0.612250 -0.451914 -0.110107 -0.665357 
 S.D. dependent  1.419548  1.859424  2.214035  2.209210  10.70271 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  6330.808    
 Determinant resid covariance  522.2922    
 Log likelihood -286.2666    
 Akaike information criterion  24.37618    
 Schwarz criterion  26.99301    
      
      
 
Diagnostic Tests for model (1) : 
Table 7: Hetroscedasticity test: 
VAR Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only levels and squares) 
Date: 01/28/14   Time: 14:20    
Sample: 1982 2012     
Included observations: 28    
      
            
   Joint test:     
      
      Chi-sq df Prob.    
      
       304.7231 300  0.4133    
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   Individual components:    
      
      Dependent R-squared F(20,7) Prob. Chi-sq(20) Prob. 
      
      res1*res1  0.679641  0.742526  0.7194  19.02996  0.5199 
res2*res2  0.795113  1.358262  0.3557  22.26318  0.3264 
res3*res3  0.663888  0.691320  0.7578  18.58887  0.5487 
res4*res4  0.839490  1.830552  0.2106  23.50573  0.2646 
res5*res5  0.966852  10.20868  0.0021  27.07185  0.1333 
res2*res1  0.711076  0.861391  0.6326  19.91013  0.4636 
res3*res1  0.548377  0.424982  0.9369  15.35454  0.7558 
res3*res2  0.832990  1.745677  0.2306  23.32371  0.2732 
res4*res1  0.828845  1.694935  0.2436  23.20767  0.2787 
res4*res2  0.906732  3.402620  0.0516  25.38849  0.1870 
res4*res3  0.817807  1.571044  0.2793  22.89861  0.2938 
res5*res1  0.783428  1.266088  0.3959  21.93597  0.3440 
res5*res2  0.873146  2.409083  0.1184  24.44810  0.2234 
res5*res3  0.730521  0.948801  0.5730  20.45458  0.4298 
res5*res4  0.735487  0.973184  0.5572  20.59363  0.4214 
      
            
Table 8: Autocorrelation Test: 
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag 
order h 
Date: 01/28/14   Time: 14:23 
Sample: 1982 2012  
Included observations: 28 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  29.82565  0.2309 
2  24.24086  0.5055 
   
   Probs from chi-square with 25 df. 
 
Table 9: Stability Test: 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: D(RGDPG,1) 
D(RPRCONSGDP,1) D(RPUBINVESTGDP,1) 
D(RPRINVESTGDP,1) D(NEXPGDP,1)  
Exogenous variables: C  
Lag specification: 1 2 
Date: 01/28/14   Time: 14:22 
  
       Root Modulus 
  
  -0.367238 - 0.667571i  0.761916 
-0.367238 + 0.667571i  0.761916 
-0.662086  0.662086 
 0.614316  0.614316 
 0.230704 - 0.538200i  0.585562 
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 0.230704 + 0.538200i  0.585562 
-0.419511  0.419511 
 0.340444  0.340444 
-0.205700 - 0.241127i  0.316946 
-0.205700 + 0.241127i  0.316946 
  
   No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
  
 
 
Table 10: Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) for model 1: 
 
 
     
     
 Period D(RGDPG,1) 
D(RPRCONS
GDP,1) 
D(RPRINVES
TGDP,1) 
D(NEXPGDP,
1) 
     
      1  0.000000  0.000000 -0.743618  2.244526 
  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.37993)  (1.41797) 
 2  0.083036 -0.096717  0.957768  0.287301 
  (0.31390)  (0.46917)  (0.50774)  (2.18976) 
 3 -0.102292  0.471467  0.191447 -2.923910 
  (0.29935)  (0.41964)  (0.50661)  (2.05069) 
 4  0.067307 -0.016613 -0.220583  1.382882 
  (0.23076)  (0.28048)  (0.39457)  (2.10915) 
 5  0.223546 -0.187220 -0.028943  1.404958 
  (0.20863)  (0.25292)  (0.32880)  (1.81850) 
 6 -0.099648  0.080196  0.026404 -1.491731 
  (0.15900)  (0.19587)  (0.27143)  (1.64348) 
 7 -0.007386  0.040248 -0.041479  0.575757 
  (0.12406)  (0.17472)  (0.21469)  (1.32561) 
 8  0.053469 -0.067741  0.057510  0.316881 
  (0.11183)  (0.13637)  (0.17345)  (1.20702) 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
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 9 -0.025927  0.054119  0.012061 -0.552381 
  (0.09382)  (0.11695)  (0.13092)  (1.00841) 
 10 -0.004826  0.004027 -0.035203  0.200642 
  (0.07391)  (0.09345)  (0.10198)  (0.84733) 
     
      Cholesky Ordering: D(RGDPG,1) D(RPRCONSGDP,1) 
D(RPUBINVESTGDP,1) D(RPRINVESTGDP,1) 
D(NEXPGDP,1)     
 Standard Errors: Analytic     
     
      
 
Table 11: Cumulative Impulse Response Functions (CIRFs) for model 1: 
 
     
     
 Period D(RGDPG,1) 
D(RPRCONS
GDP,1) 
D(RPRINVES
TGDP,1) 
D(NEXPGDP,
1) 
     
      1  0.000000  0.000000 -0.743618  2.244526 
  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.37993)  (1.41797) 
 2  0.083036 -0.096717  0.214150  2.531827 
  (0.31390)  (0.46917)  (0.61449)  (1.89585) 
 3 -0.019257  0.374750  0.405598 -0.392083 
  (0.49464)  (0.69128)  (0.79240)  (2.08018) 
 4  0.048050  0.358137  0.185015  0.990799 
  (0.53754)  (0.65015)  (0.72192)  (1.45147) 
 5  0.271596  0.170917  0.156072  2.395757 
  (0.58714)  (0.64208)  (0.70963)  (1.73356) 
 6  0.171948  0.251113  0.182475  0.904026 
  (0.61432)  (0.60806)  (0.72114)  (1.68787) 
 7  0.164562  0.291361  0.140996  1.479783 
  (0.59646)  (0.54493)  (0.68249)  (1.36825) 
 8  0.218031  0.223620  0.198507  1.796664 
  (0.62481)  (0.58294)  (0.69871)  (1.60841) 
     
      Cholesky Ordering: D(RGDPG,1) D(RPRCONSGDP,1) 
D(RPUBINVESTGDP,1) D(RPRINVESTGDP,1) 
D(NEXPGDP,1)     
 Standard Errors: Analytic     
     
      
ADF unit root tests for public investment categories in model 2:  
Table 12: RLIVGDP is I(0) 
Null Hypothesis: RLIVGDP has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=2) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.481971  0.0011 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.644302  
 5% level  -1.952473  
 10% level  -1.610211  
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*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RLIVGDP)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/28/14   Time: 11:12   
Sample (adjusted): 1983 2012   
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     RLIVGDP(-1) -0.597031 0.171464 -3.481971 0.0016 
     
     R-squared 0.294620    Mean dependent var 0.227167 
Adjusted R-squared 0.294620    S.D. dependent var 13.80048 
S.E. of regression 11.59060    Akaike info criterion 7.771031 
Sum squared resid 3895.918    Schwarz criterion 7.817737 
Log likelihood -115.5655    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.785973 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.189187    
     
      
 
Table 13: RAGRICGDP is I(0) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RAGRICGDP has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=2) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.635971  0.0009 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.670170  
 5% level  -2.963972  
 10% level  -2.621007  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RAGRICGDP)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/28/14   Time: 11:14   
Sample (adjusted): 1983 2012   
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     RAGRICGDP(-1) -0.866693 0.186950 -4.635971 0.0001 
C 0.798545 0.331265 2.410595 0.0227 
     
     R-squared 0.434255    Mean dependent var 0.008027 
Adjusted R-squared 0.414049    S.D. dependent var 2.032164 
S.E. of regression 1.555569    Akaike info criterion 3.785900 
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Sum squared resid 67.75423    Schwarz criterion 3.879313 
Log likelihood -54.78850    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.815784 
F-statistic 21.49223    Durbin-Watson stat 2.009874 
     
      
 
Table 14: RINDUSGDP is I(0) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RINDUSGDP has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=2) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.615431  0.0009 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.670170  
 5% level  -2.963972  
 10% level  -2.621007  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RINDUSGDP)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/28/14   Time: 11:15   
Sample (adjusted): 1983 2012   
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     RINDUSGDP(-1) -0.862771 0.186932 -4.615431 0.0001 
C 5.335887 2.044765 2.609536 0.0144 
     
     R-squared 0.432074    Mean dependent var 0.145493 
Adjusted R-squared 0.411791    S.D. dependent var 12.19601 
S.E. of regression 9.353708    Akaike info criterion 7.373763 
Sum squared resid 2449.772    Schwarz criterion 7.467176 
Log likelihood -108.6064    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.403647 
F-statistic 21.30220    Durbin-Watson stat 2.019079 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000079    
     
      
 
Table 15: ROTHGDP I(0) 
Null Hypothesis: ROTHGDP has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=2) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.604960  0.0008 
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Test critical values: 1% level  -2.644302  
 5% level  -1.952473  
 10% level  -1.610211  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(ROTHGDP)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/28/14   Time: 11:38   
Sample (adjusted): 1983 2012   
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ROTHGDP(-1) -0.622983 0.172813 -3.604960 0.0012 
     
     R-squared 0.309410    Mean dependent var 0.004914 
Adjusted R-squared 0.309410    S.D. dependent var 0.630645 
S.E. of regression 0.524077    Akaike info criterion 1.578407 
Sum squared resid 7.965031    Schwarz criterion 1.625114 
Log likelihood -22.67611    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.593349 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.160796    
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Table 16: VAR model 2: 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates      
 Date: 01/28/14   Time: 13:21      
 Sample (adjusted): 1984 2012      
 Included observations: 29 after adjustments     
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]     
        
        
 D(RGDPG,1) 
D(RPRCONSG
DP,1) RLIVGDP RAGRICGDP RINDUSGDP ROTHGDP 
D(RPRINVEST
GDP,1) 
        
        D(RGDPG(-1),1)  0.130035  0.106533  0.582771  0.030482  0.293642  0.027319  0.286249 
  (0.21358)  (0.29148)  (1.74647)  (0.26179)  (1.53166)  (0.07970)  (0.36599) 
 [ 0.60884] [ 0.36549] [ 0.33369] [ 0.11644] [ 0.19171] [ 0.34277] [ 0.78213] 
        
D(RPRCONSGDP(-1),1) -0.140589 -0.132479  0.846992  0.126651  0.936361  0.038676  0.264474 
  (0.18930)  (0.25835)  (1.54796)  (0.23204)  (1.35757)  (0.07064)  (0.32439) 
 [-0.74266] [-0.51280] [ 0.54717] [ 0.54583] [ 0.68973] [ 0.54750] [ 0.81530] 
        
RLIVGDP(-1)  0.143623  0.252439  0.787077 -0.019679 -0.096206  0.030340  0.097559 
  (0.20400)  (0.27840)  (1.66814)  (0.25005)  (1.46297)  (0.07613)  (0.34957) 
 [ 0.70403] [ 0.90674] [ 0.47183] [-0.07870] [-0.06576] [ 0.39855] [ 0.27908] 
        
RAGRICGDP(-1)  0.004295 -2.705231 -4.644756  0.026877 -5.069365 -0.088422  2.277942 
  (1.53393)  (2.09338)  (12.5432)  (1.88019)  (11.0004)  (0.57242)  (2.62853) 
 [ 0.00280] [-1.29228] [-0.37030] [ 0.01429] [-0.46083] [-0.15447] [ 0.86662] 
        
RINDUSGDP(-1) -0.013923  0.415733  1.807498  0.277814  2.128662  0.078047 -0.148176 
  (0.22136)  (0.30209)  (1.81005)  (0.27132)  (1.58743)  (0.08260)  (0.37931) 
 [-0.06290] [ 1.37621] [ 0.99859] [ 1.02393] [ 1.34095] [ 0.94484] [-0.39064] 
        
ROTHGDP(-1) -1.409680 -4.299415 -35.65311 -4.747537 -21.79581 -1.802608 -6.774839 
  (5.36456)  (7.32110)  (43.8667)  (6.57552)  (38.4714)  (2.00189)  (9.19265) 
 [-0.26278] [-0.58726] [-0.81276] [-0.72200] [-0.56655] [-0.90046] [-0.73698] 
        
D(RPRINVESTGDP(-1),1)  0.094422  0.166359 -0.266899 -0.016803 -0.259399 -0.008253 -0.063963 
  (0.13947)  (0.19034)  (1.14050)  (0.17096)  (1.00023)  (0.05205)  (0.23900) 
 [ 0.67699] [ 0.87400] [-0.23402] [-0.09829] [-0.25934] [-0.15856] [-0.26763] 
        
C -0.605703  0.205616  5.562501  0.744026  4.868042  0.242465 -0.054911 
  (0.32193)  (0.43934)  (2.63246)  (0.39460)  (2.30869)  (0.12013)  (0.55166) 
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 [-1.88147] [ 0.46801] [ 2.11304] [ 1.88552] [ 2.10857] [ 2.01828] [-0.09954] 
        
         R-squared  0.267611  0.221964  0.138703  0.120741  0.168178  0.126470  0.107173 
 Adj. R-squared  0.023481 -0.037382 -0.148395 -0.172345 -0.109096 -0.164706 -0.190436 
 Sum sq. resids  40.14456  74.76709  2684.281  60.31393  2064.592  5.590315  117.8798 
 S.E. equation  1.382623  1.886886  11.30588  1.694725  9.915336  0.515951  2.369245 
 F-statistic  1.096182  0.855861  0.483121  0.411965  0.606540  0.434343  0.360112 
 Log likelihood -45.86449 -54.88191 -106.8034 -51.76709 -102.9974 -17.27844 -61.48357 
 Akaike AIC  3.714792  4.336683  7.917473  4.121869  7.654993  1.743341  4.791971 
 Schwarz SC  4.091977  4.713868  8.294659  4.499054  8.032178  2.120526  5.169156 
 Mean dependent -0.229690  0.554099  7.238534  0.941260  6.292376  0.313747 -0.127771 
 S.D. dependent  1.399147  1.852577  10.55015  1.565206  9.415055  0.478080  2.171485 
        
         Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  0.277701      
 Determinant resid covariance  0.028995      
 Log likelihood -236.7055      
 Akaike information criterion  20.18658      
 Schwarz criterion  22.82688      
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Diagnostic Tests for model 2: 
Table 17: Hetroscedasticity Test: 
VAR Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only levels and squares) 
Date: 01/28/14   Time: 13:17    
Sample: 1982 2012     
Included observations: 29    
      
            
   Joint test:     
      
      Chi-sq df Prob.    
      
       406.0000 392  0.3023    
      
            
   Individual components:    
      
      Dependent R-squared F(14,14) Prob. Chi-sq(14) Prob. 
      
      res1*res1  0.234718  0.306707  0.9828  6.806813  0.9419 
res2*res2  0.485943  0.945309  0.5412  14.09234  0.4429 
res3*res3  0.594064  1.463442  0.2427  17.22785  0.2442 
res4*res4  0.593017  1.457107  0.2451  17.19750  0.2458 
res5*res5  0.590887  1.444313  0.2502  17.13573  0.2490 
res6*res6  0.594012  1.463126  0.2428  17.22634  0.2443 
res7*res7  0.492943  0.972165  0.5207  14.29535  0.4279 
res2*res1  0.289185  0.406835  0.9481  8.386355  0.8682 
res3*res1  0.600601  1.503763  0.2275  17.41743  0.2346 
res3*res2  0.348971  0.536030  0.8722  10.12016  0.7533 
res4*res1  0.620163  1.632705  0.1850  17.98471  0.2075 
res4*res2  0.311773  0.453009  0.9247  9.041423  0.8284 
res4*res3  0.591727  1.449340  0.2482  17.16007  0.2477 
res5*res1  0.605319  1.533693  0.2168  17.55426  0.2278 
res5*res2  0.310721  0.450791  0.9259  9.010899  0.8304 
res5*res3  0.591340  1.447019  0.2491  17.14885  0.2483 
res5*res4  0.592066  1.451380  0.2474  17.16993  0.2472 
res6*res1  0.623612  1.656835  0.1780  18.08476  0.2029 
res6*res2  0.353274  0.546250  0.8650  10.24495  0.7441 
res6*res3  0.594606  1.466737  0.2414  17.24358  0.2434 
res6*res4  0.592486  1.453903  0.2464  17.18209  0.2466 
res6*res5  0.591633  1.448778  0.2484  17.15736  0.2479 
res7*res1  0.133774  0.154434  0.9994  3.879459  0.9961 
res7*res2  0.258075  0.347844  0.9712  7.484163  0.9144 
res7*res3  0.581271  1.388181  0.2738  16.85687  0.2639 
res7*res4  0.632671  1.722353  0.1603  18.34745  0.1914 
res7*res5  0.582928  1.397669  0.2696  16.90492  0.2613 
res7*res6  0.565880  1.303509  0.3133  16.41051  0.2890 
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Table 18: Autocorrelation Test: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 19: Stability Test: 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: D(RGDPG,1) 
D(RPRCONSGDP,1) RLIVGDP RAGRICGDP 
RINDUSGDP ROTHGDP D(RPRINVESTGDP,1)  
Exogenous variables: C  
Lag specification: 1 1 
Date: 01/28/14   Time: 13:19 
  
       Root Modulus 
  
   0.791219  0.791219 
-0.515994  0.515994 
 0.438844  0.438844 
 0.256967 - 0.194449i  0.322246 
 0.256967 + 0.194449i  0.322246 
-0.180733  0.180733 
 0.026331  0.026331 
  
   No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
  
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag 
order h 
Date: 02/02/14   Time: 09:54 
Sample: 1982 2012  
Included observations: 29 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  52.36974  0.3446 
   
   Probs from chi-square with 49 df. 
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Table 20: Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) for model 2: 
 
     
      Response of 
D(RGDPG,1):     
 Period RLIVGDP RAGRICGDP RINDUSGDP ROTHGDP 
     
      1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
 2  0.680125 -0.076124  0.011703 -0.041749 
  (0.29382)  (0.21332)  (0.21534)  (0.26358) 
 3  0.112265  0.015366 -0.034092 -0.138987 
  (0.22654)  (0.21396)  (0.18222)  (0.19122) 
 4  0.020838 -0.029820  0.093622  0.027499 
  (0.12555)  (0.18888)  (0.11163)  (0.09367) 
 5 -0.051971 -0.040720  0.030211  0.009187 
  (0.06715)  (0.16357)  (0.06755)  (0.04931) 
 6 -0.017689 -0.061889  0.023904  0.012550 
  (0.05188)  (0.13832)  (0.04376)  (0.03688) 
 7 -0.015310 -0.056292 -0.002149 -0.003168 
  (0.03560)  (0.11568)  (0.03232)  (0.02531) 
 8 -0.002163 -0.051647 -0.002958 -0.003648 
  (0.02519)  (0.09504)  (0.02817)  (0.02016) 
 9 -0.002067 -0.041826 -0.007274 -0.006268 
  (0.01922)  (0.07794)  (0.02363)  (0.01636) 
 10  0.000531 -0.034461 -0.005506 -0.004903 
  (0.01522)  (0.06460)  (0.01949)  (0.01328) 
     
      Response of     
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
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D(RPRCONSGD  
 Period RLIVGDP RAGRICGDP RINDUSGDP ROTHGDP 
     
      1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
 2  0.067730 -0.329862  0.354570 -0.164909 
  (0.39526)  (0.30543)  (0.30173)  (0.36262) 
 3 -0.206158 -0.252785  0.118314  0.055661 
  (0.25782)  (0.25126)  (0.20773)  (0.21623) 
 4 -0.060744 -0.354134  0.104838  0.036592 
  (0.18779)  (0.29216)  (0.17703)  (0.14911) 
 5 -0.073982 -0.308886 -0.018038 -0.023310 
  (0.14787)  (0.28806)  (0.14035)  (0.09336) 
 6 -0.009870 -0.282438 -0.016057 -0.021047 
  (0.12224)  (0.29173)  (0.11655)  (0.07794) 
 7 -0.011965 -0.228383 -0.039487 -0.034169 
  (0.10037)  (0.27992)  (0.09760)  (0.06183) 
 8  0.002655 -0.188571 -0.029667 -0.026514 
  (0.08164)  (0.26572)  (0.08138)  (0.05311) 
 9 -1.61E-05 -0.149470 -0.029418 -0.024911 
  (0.06541)  (0.24652)  (0.06767)  (0.04425) 
 10  0.002704 -0.119925 -0.022303 -0.019150 
  (0.05199)  (0.22596)  (0.05530)  (0.03795) 
     
      Response of 
D(RPRINVEST
GDP,1):     
 Period RLIVGDP RAGRICGDP RINDUSGDP ROTHGDP 
     
      1 -0.369778 -0.204019  0.552824  0.308969 
  (0.41246)  (0.40871)  (0.40132)  (0.39261) 
 2  0.054921  0.179902 -0.298460 -0.360614 
  (0.48442)  (0.37133)  (0.37233)  (0.45032) 
 3  0.278588  0.093967  0.126781  0.034592 
  (0.29207)  (0.28147)  (0.23907)  (0.26278) 
 4 -0.038573  0.134815 -0.002015 -0.029845 
  (0.15300)  (0.27774)  (0.15277)  (0.13131) 
 5  0.011109  0.059492  0.076215  0.043615 
  (0.09602)  (0.23283)  (0.09898)  (0.08200) 
 6 -0.033748  0.049589  0.014032  0.009437 
  (0.05678)  (0.20881)  (0.05593)  (0.04765) 
 7 -0.001914  0.022531  0.022591  0.015688 
  (0.03392)  (0.17573)  (0.04131)  (0.03181) 
 8 -0.008672  0.018456  0.003633  0.003254 
  (0.02013)  (0.14753)  (0.02907)  (0.02471) 
 9  0.000271  0.010703  0.006042  0.004419 
  (0.01089)  (0.12091)  (0.02347)  (0.01891) 
 10 -0.001909  0.009011  0.001347  0.001238 
  (0.00673)  (0.09876)  (0.01825)  (0.01575) 
     
      Cholesky Ordering: D(RGDPG,1) D(RPRCONSGDP,1) RLIVGDP 
RAGRICGDP RINDUSGDP ROTHGDP D(RPRINVESTGDP,1)     
 Standard Error: Analytic     
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Table 21: Cumulative Impulse Response Functions (CIRFs) for model 2: 
     
      Accumulated 
Response of 
D(RGDPG,1):     
 Period RLIVGDP RAGRICGDP RINDUSGDP ROTHGDP 
     
      1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
 2  0.680125 -0.076124  0.011703 -0.041749 
  (0.29382)  (0.21332)  (0.21534)  (0.26358) 
 3  0.792390 -0.060759 -0.022388 -0.180736 
  (0.42046)  (0.39457)  (0.32147)  (0.29434) 
 4  0.813227 -0.090578  0.071234 -0.153238 
  (0.45846)  (0.55697)  (0.38898)  (0.29418) 
 5  0.761256 -0.131298  0.101445 -0.144051 
  (0.45354)  (0.69334)  (0.41812)  (0.28741) 
 6  0.743567 -0.193187  0.125350 -0.131501 
  (0.43542)  (0.80560)  (0.42175)  (0.27914) 
 7  0.728257 -0.249479  0.123200 -0.134668 
  (0.42345)  (0.89900)  (0.41571)  (0.27646) 
 8  0.726094 -0.301126  0.120243 -0.138316 
  (0.41840)  (0.97521)  (0.40759)  (0.27608) 
 9  0.724027 -0.342952  0.112968 -0.144584 
  (0.41780)  (1.03723)  (0.40111)  (0.27773) 
 10  0.724558 -0.377413  0.107462 -0.149487 
  (0.41901)  (1.08733)  (0.39663)  (0.27973) 
     
      Accumulated 
Response of 
D(RPRCONSGDP,1):     
 Period RLIVGDP RAGRICGDP RINDUSGDP ROTHGDP 
     
      1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
 2  0.067730 -0.329862  0.354570 -0.164909 
  (0.39526)  (0.30543)  (0.30173)  (0.36262) 
 3 -0.138428 -0.582646  0.472884 -0.109249 
  (0.52414)  (0.51586)  (0.40440)  (0.34731) 
 4 -0.199172 -0.936781  0.577723 -0.072657 
  (0.66201)  (0.78833)  (0.55339)  (0.44074) 
 5 -0.273154 -1.245667  0.559685 -0.095967 
  (0.75836)  (1.04738)  (0.65400)  (0.48264) 
 6 -0.283024 -1.528106  0.543627 -0.117014 
  (0.84108)  (1.31156)  (0.74274)  (0.53593) 
 7 -0.294989 -1.756489  0.504141 -0.151183 
  (0.90660)  (1.56066)  (0.80662)  (0.57077) 
 8 -0.292333 -1.945060  0.474473 -0.177696 
  (0.96127)  (1.79649)  (0.85873)  (0.60526) 
 9 -0.292350 -2.094530  0.445055 -0.202607 
  (1.00588)  (2.01314)  (0.89807)  (0.63198) 
 10 -0.289645 -2.214455  0.422752 -0.221757 
  (1.04253)  (2.21079)  (0.92932)  (0.65606) 
     
      Accumulated     
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Response of 
D(RPRINVESTGDP,1)
: 
 Period RLIVGDP RAGRICGDP RINDUSGDP ROTHGDP 
     
      1 -0.369778 -0.204019  0.552824  0.308969 
  (0.41246)  (0.40871)  (0.40132)  (0.39261) 
 2 -0.314857 -0.024117  0.254365 -0.051645 
  (0.60248)  (0.51488)  (0.51653)  (0.57756) 
 3 -0.036268  0.069850  0.381146 -0.017052 
  (0.72607)  (0.73050)  (0.62611)  (0.57042) 
 4 -0.074842  0.204665  0.379131 -0.046897 
  (0.76433)  (0.93889)  (0.70291)  (0.58634) 
 5 -0.063733  0.264157  0.455346 -0.003282 
  (0.76648)  (1.12416)  (0.73788)  (0.58032) 
 6 -0.097481  0.313745  0.469378  0.006155 
  (0.76119)  (1.29376)  (0.75377)  (0.58696) 
 7 -0.099396  0.336277  0.491969  0.021843 
  (0.76006)  (1.43842)  (0.75595)  (0.58767) 
 8 -0.108067  0.354733  0.495602  0.025097 
  (0.76002)  (1.56250)  (0.75459)  (0.59220) 
 9 -0.107797  0.365436  0.501644  0.029516 
  (0.76131)  (1.66499)  (0.75109)  (0.59446) 
 10 -0.109706  0.374447  0.502991  0.030753 
  (0.76228)  (1.74967)  (0.74787)  (0.59766) 
     
      Cholesky Ordering: D(RGDPG,1) D(RPRCONSGDP,1) RLIVGDP 
RAGRICGDP RINDUSGDP ROTHGDP D(RPRINVESTGDP,1)     
 Standard Errors: Analytic     
     
      
 
 
 
